Category: International Relations

India will be the voice of the Global South, which is typically underrepresented in such fora, according to EAM S Jaishankar, who was speaking on December 1 as India assumed the chairmanship of the G20 group of nations for the years 2022 to 2023.

Global South

• Since then, the phrase has been used numerous times, most notably when Jaishankar stated of ongoing international crises that “polarisation may occur elsewhere, the people who suffer most are the Global South.”
• The terms “Global North” and “Global South” are used to describe a broad range of nations, including the United States, Canada, Europe, Russia, Australia, and New Zealand.
• The ‘Global North’ and the ‘Global South’ are the two sides of a binary difference.
• The practise of grouping nations into broad groups for simpler examination has long been used in the study of international political systems.
• One illustration of this is the idea of “East” and “West,” with the Western nations typically denoting greater levels of economic development and wealth among their citizens.
• Eastern nations were thought to be going through this transformation.

Other such categorizations

First World, Second World, and Third World nations are categorised similarly.

It made reference to nations related to the US, USSR, and non-aligned countries alliances from the Cold War era.

The concept of the “third” world highlighted how distinct it was from both the “first,” or the capitalist West, and the “second,” or the socialist “East.”

World Systems Approach

• The World Systems approach, which sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein introduced in 1974 and emphasises an integrated perspective of looking at global politics, is at the core of these ideas.
• He claimed that there are three main production zones: the core, the periphery, and the semi-periphery.
• Being the proprietors of cutting-edge technologies, such as the US or Japan, the core zones make money.
• On the other hand, industry in peripheral zones is less complex and requires more labour.
• India and Brazil are examples of nations in the centre.

Need for new terms

(1) Global shift of powers

• The First Era/Third World distinction was no longer applicable in the post-Cold War world.
• This is so because most nations were forced to form some sort of alliance with the capitalist US, the last remaining superpower, when the communist USSR collapsed in 1991.

(2) Monolithic classification

• The East/West dichotomy was thought to frequently support preconceived notions about Asian and African nations.
• It was considered oversimplistic to lump together so many extremely distinct nations.
• Additionally, it was believed that classifying certain nations as “developed” while others weren’t was too broad and unsuitable for addressing issues.

(3) Issues with Developed vs. Developing

• From the standpoint of his company’s charitable endeavours, Bill Gates wrote on the “developing” label in 2014.
• Any category that combines China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo confuses more people than it clarifies, the irony was discovered.
• Some supposedly developing nations have advanced to the point where it is reasonable to say they have developed.
• Several failing states are barely progressing at all. The majority of nations fall somewhere in the middle.

Emergence of Global South

• Colonial past: The South’s countries have a lot in common, including a history of colonisation that was mostly carried out by European powers.
• Having no voice since decolonization It’s interesting that the region has historically been excluded from important international organisations, such as the UN’s permanent membership.
• Awareness of decision-making: These nations view their absence as a factor in their slower progress because organisations like the UN and the IMF are involved in key decisions that have a global impact on politics, the economy, and society.
• Economic emergence: Over the past 20 years, China and India have experienced strong economic growth.
• Declining US hegemony: Many believe that today, rather than having the US alone control international events, the globe is becoming multipolar.
• Climate reparations: The Northern nations, who have historically contributed to higher carbon emissions, are now being discussed as paying for funding green energy.

Criticism of the classification

• Not many players: The South merely seeks to displace the North and the positions it holds, reinforcing a cycle in which a few few nations amass critical resources.
• More of a China vs. India rivalry The topic of whether elites from the global South and “emerging powers” actually intend to challenge the dominant institutions of global capitalist development is currently the subject of much debate.
• Anti-china bias: The broad Belt and Road Initiative finally evolved from China’s hesitant “going out” approach at the turn of the century.Where does India stand?
• No more sexism in the diplomatic community, EAM S Jaishankar Rebuilding a worldwide trade union against the North is not India’s goal.
• India is eager to act as a link between the North and the South by emphasising pragmatic results rather than resuming previous ideological conflicts.

Challenges

• Political consistency: India’s excitement for the Global South has always lagged behind its material might and political will.
• Building bridges between the neighbours: India must also accept that the Global South is not a cohesive entity with a single common objective.
• Despaired South: In terms of money and power, needs and capacities, there is a lot of diversity within the South today.
• The Global South’s numerous internal and regional crises during the Cold War era weakened India’s Third World policy (and the Non-Aligned Movement).

Way forward

• More neighbourhood involvement: Supporting the Global South now will necessitate more active Indian participation in the complex regional politics of the developing countries.
• Political coherence: There won’t be a conflict between the simultaneous pursuit of universal and specific aims if India can turn this aspiration into effective policy.

A price restriction on Russian oil under a G7 proposal recently took effect. The idea, which took months to materialise, aims to strike a delicate balance between preventing supply disruptions on the world oil market, which would drive up prices, and starving the Russian government of oil profits in order to financially cripple its war against Ukraine. However, the action runs the danger of disrupting the world crude oil market.

Price cap on Russian oil

• The $60 per barrel cap and denial of infrastructure services to Russian oil are designed to reduce Russia’s oil revenues while keeping Russian crude on the market by forbidding Western allies from providing insurance, maritime services, and financial support for tanker cargoes priced above a set dollar-per-barrel cap.
• Try to reduce Russia’s oil income and put pressure on it: The US’s proposed cap is intended to harm Moscow’s finances while preventing a significant increase in oil prices in the event that Russia’s oil is abruptly removed from the world market.
• Impact on shipping: Tanker owners may be hesitant to accept Russian oil and may encounter difficulties delivering it if they lack insurance.

Russian response to the price cap

• Russia has declared that it will not adhere to the restriction and that it will stop supplying nations that do.
• Retaliate by stopping the shipments: In an effort to benefit from an abruptly higher global oil price on whatever it can sell in spite of the sanctions, it could retaliate by stopping the shipments.
• Price caps won’t prevent the war’s financing, according to Russia. The cap, according to recent statements from Russia, won’t have an impact on the funding of its “special military operation” in Ukraine.
• Other buyers might circumvent the limitations by prioritising national interests: Chinese and Indian consumers would object to the cap, and Russia or China might try to establish their own insurance companies to replace those that the US, UK, and Europe have blocked. It’s also conceivable that these nations will devise inventive ways to get beyond the limitations set by the G7.

Impacts on the world’s oil supply chain

• Russian oil can now only be transported using the infrastructure of the G7 countries if it is sold for $60 per barrel or less. In general, this means that Russian oil cannot be transported anywhere in the world using the infrastructure of the G7 countries’ tankers, insurance, etc.
• Higher cost of purchasing oil from Russia: Given that the majority of businesses that provide shipping and insurance services are based in these G7 countries, purchasing oil from Russia at a higher cost is challenging. In the week before this announcement, Urals crude was trading in the mid-$60s range.
• Purchasing nations are at a disadvantage but remain below Brent crude oil prices Even while Russia has failed to comply with this regulation and the cap will disfavour nations that choose to purchase oil from Russia at a price greater than $60 per barrel, the price will still be significantly lower than Brent crude oil, which is presently selling at over $81 per barrel.
• Nations that carried on commerce despite opposition: So far, nations like India and China have kept up their commerce with Russia in spite of opposition from the west.

Response from India and bilateral commerce with Russia

• India and Russia now have more bilateral trade than ever before: In reality, as this newspaper has noted, India and Russia’s bilateral commerce has risen to a record high in the first five months of the year (April-August).
• India prioritising its own interests and benefiting from the sale price: India increased its oil imports from Russia by taking advantage of the discounts being offered, putting its interests first. Previously importing less than 1% of its import needs from Russia, India now buys around a fifth of its oil from that nation.
• Given that India imports oil, the transaction at a reduced price will help to reduce the current account deficit and promote economic stability. After all, lower crude oil prices will ease price pressures in the economy and relieve the current account deficit, reducing risks to macroeconomic stability for an oil importer like India, which fulfils the vast majority of its needs through imports.
• India rejected the alleged moral obligation: India denied any “moral” obligation to join the coalition for a price cap.

Conclusion

Any attempts to use commerce as a weapon will merely skew the world market and harm energy-poor customers who are not to blame for the conflict. India has been governed by its sovereign interests in its response to the West’s reprisal against Russia for the war in Ukraine thus far. This must remain the underlying principle.

The first “China-Indian Ocean Region Forum” was organised by China’s leading development aid organisation in Kunming, in the southwest of the country.

The China Indian Ocean Region Forum: What Is It?

• The China International Development Cooperation Agency is in charge of organising it (CIDCA).
• It is the most recent Indian Ocean region-focused Chinese programme (IOR).
• Beijing’s growing strategic ambitions in a region where its economic influence has been expanding are highlighted by this.

About

The CIDCA is a new development assistance organisation in China that is comparable to the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

It aims to-

• Enhancing the coordination of policies
• Intensify cooperation for development,
• Enhance the capacity of relevant countries to reap economic benefits from the sustainable use of marine resources, including fisheries, renewable energy, tourism, and shipping. Increase resilience to shocks and disasters.

Which countries have backed the forum?

• According to the forum’s organisers, senior officials and high-level representatives from 19 different nations attended.
• But at least two of those nations—Australia and the Maldives—subsequently issued denials of the assertion, highlighting the fact that they did not take part formally.

Reasons for such a move by China

Three reasons have driven China’s aspirations in the Indian Ocean:

• Increasing relevance of the Indo-Pacific: Beijing seeks to challenge other big powers, such as India, and establish its hegemony as the Indo-Pacific region becomes the centre of the new global order.
• Beijing’s dependence on the Indian Ocean for energy security and continued economic growth determines its foreign policy and international clout.
• Hegemony establishment: China may demonstrate its presence and influence from the China Sea to the Indian Ocean by creating new and alternative institutions with IOR nations, showing its standing as a big power.

How is China perceiving its interests?

• Political corruption: Through corruption, party funding, and by turning a blind eye to their violations of human rights and democratic flaws, Beijing has established intimate and personal links with the political elites and parties of IOR nations.
• Friendships with several political parties in Pakistan, goodwill toward the Rajapaksa family in Sri Lanka, and tight ties to Abdulla Yameen of the Maldives are a few instances of this pervasive tendency known as fractionalization.
• Elite capture: In addition, China has frequently employed this strategy to secure a pro-China stance and win important projects with geoeconomic and strategic implications. This comprises concessions on the Colombo Port City project in Sri Lanka and the Gwadar Port in Pakistan.

Where does India stand?

• India was the only participant in the forum who did not accept the invitation.
• China has made its intentions clear to the nations of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
• A Chinese military tracking vessel, the Yuan Wang 5, recently paid a visit to Sri Lanka, and New Delhi has been wary of China’s recent moves in the area.
• Additionally, India views the Indian-Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as a regional platform that has already achieved success.

Conclusion

The new endeavour, in a way, is a reflection of China’s never-ending avarice. It also symbolises China’s aim and ambition to match the US’s reach and outreach and, thus, to be comparable to the US in terms of geo-economics, geo-politics, and geo-strategic mat

The “Look East” and “Act East” policies of India have transitioned into an Indo-Pacific policy and strategy phase. However, the conceptions of this policy in North-eastern and Eastern India are distinct from what we in the national capital understand as the “Indo-Pacific.”

Indo-pacific

• The Indo-Pacific is a geographical area that is understood differently by various nations.
• While the geography of the Indo-Pacific extends up to the west coast of India for the US and from the eastern coast of Africa to Oceania for India, this is also the geographic boundaries of the US Indo-Pacific command.

Importance of North-East

• India’s security: As it moves toward improved security circumstances and development, the Northeast, which consists of seven “sisters” or States and one “brother,” Sikkim, has undergone transformation.
• Biodiversity and geography As the geographical “gateway” for a large portion of India’s indigenous flora and fauna, the north-eastern Indian States are blessed with a diverse range of physiographic and ecoclimatic conditions.
• Only connecting link along the Siliguri Corridor: 3.8% of the country’s inhabitants reside in the North-East, which also makes up 8% of India’s total land area. The Siliguri corridor, sometimes referred to as the “chicken’s neck” in West Bengal, connects this area to the remainder of the country’s mainland.

Present condition

• Enhanced security: Since 2017, the state of security has greatly improved. However, the fundamental problems driving the insurgency continue to be unsolved.
• A significant non-traditional threat The authorities’ and other people’s opinions of security were noticeably different. According to the official line of thinking, insurgent activity, transnational border crime, smuggling, drug trafficking, and the influx of refugees (from Myanmar) constituted serious non-traditional threats.
• Chinese involvement in illegal activities: China was thought to be a “continuous participant” behind these illegal activities. The Assam Rifles and other security organisations have been forced to be vigilant and take stern action as a result.
• Sensitive border management: The insensitive treatment of individuals involved in legal transactions with neighbours. A fair assessment shows that there is plenty of room for future border management that is both functional and people-focused.

Development as priority in North East

• Increasing road infrastructure: The Northeast is headed in the right direction by focusing on economic growth. Roads connecting north-eastern communities will need to be improved, and thousands of graduates from nearby institutions will need jobs.
• Manipur should be promoted as a centre for medical tourism for neighbouring countries like Myanmar and other Indian States.
• The State’s research and development facilities to take use of the region’s biodiversity need to be developed. Improved management and more investment from Indian corporations and foreign investors are essential for accelerated development.
• A strategy for economic growth To help create a practical plan for utilising opportunities related to business, connectivity, and human capital development, the strategic and business community.

Conclusion

It is important to hear from people in eastern and northeastern India when putting India’s Indo-Pacific strategy into practice. Therefore, “Think and Relate East” lies beyond “Look East” and “Act East,” especially within our own nation.

There will be an exercise called “Austra Hind 22” from November 28 to December 11. The Mahajan Field Firing Ranges in Rajasthan will host the bilateral training exercise “AUSTRA HIND 22” involving contingents of the Indian Army and the Australian Army.

Exercise AUSTRA HIND 22

• Exercise AUSTRA HIND is a yearly event that alternates between Australia and India and is a bilateral training exercise between the Australian Army and the Indian Army.
• Goal: To forge strong military ties, learn from one another’s best practises, and foster cooperation while conducting multi-domain operations in semi-desert terrain in accordance with a UN peace enforcement mission.

Significance

• The combined exercise will further contribute to the building of ties between Australia and India since it is the first in the series of Austra Hind exercises to include all weapons and services personnel from both armies.

Other exercises between India and Australia:

• Exercise Pitch Black: Since 1981, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has staged this biennial multilateral air combat exercise. In 2018, the Indian Air Force participated in the exercise for the first time.
• AUSINDEX: This bilateral maritime exercise takes place every two years between the Royal Australian Navy and the Indian Navy (RAN). The exercise’s initial iteration happened in 2015.

Whose side is India really on has become a more frequent and recurrent topic as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the conflict between Russia, the United States, and the West. In this conflict, is India supporting the U.S./West or Russia?

Issue with India taking the either side

• India opposes both sides: When major powers seek India’s backing in geopolitical conflicts like the one over Ukraine, they run into a recalcitrant India that is unwilling to follow orders.
• India is not a satellite state: India’s reluctance stems from a sense of self that sees it as a pole in the international system, not a satellite state or a camp follower. This sense of self, rather than being stubborn, is the true cause of India’s reluctance.
• India has a different position than two poles: India refuses to take sides because it views itself as a side whose interests are not accounted for by other camps or poles.
• India envisions a multipolar world: New Delhi’s repeated calls for a multipolar society are in line with this idea of itself as a pole in a multipolar society.

India as a different pole in international affairs

• No dominance in south Asia: India sees itself differently as a pole. Even when it had the ability, it never actively tried to dominate the South Asian regional subsystem.
• NATO is the only alliance: It has exhibited poor balancing behaviour, refusing to forge traditional coalitions or look for camp followers or allegiances. In fact, even its sporadic behaviour of striking a balance (such as the 1971 India-Soviet Treaty during the Bangladesh War) was dependent on circumstances.
• It believes it has a strategic periphery in South Asia, where it has a legitimate claim to supremacy, but South Asia is not a strategic peripheral region.
• It discourages meddling by other nations in that region and forbids interference in south Asia.
• India frequently tends to speak for “underprivileged collectives,” whether they are actual (South Asia) or abstract (NAM, poor countries, global south, etc.) in varied degrees. India also supports the rule of law and regional stability.

What can the rest of the world learn from India’s status as a pole?

• India as unique player in international system: India frequently adopts stances that not only serve its interests but are also motivated by its perception of being a unique player on the world stage, as evidenced by its recent or previous statements on matters of international significance, including the conflicts in Iraq and Ukraine, the air campaign in Serbia by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and climate change.
• Treating India as a partner rather than a cheerleader requires Western nations to view India as a partner. India should be included in international organisations like the UNSC, and they should consult India rather than telling it which side to support.

@the-end

India will work to further establish itself as a significant pole in the international system and resist calls to support one side or the other while it holds the G20 and SCO chairs in 2022. As a result, people who want to collaborate with India on a worldwide scale must understand how to handle the ‘India’s pole’.

India is investing heavily in free trade agreements to meet its export goal of $2 trillion by 2030. India is negotiating free trade agreements with nations like Israel, the European Union, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

Importance

• FTAs cover a wide range of topics, including tariff reduction that affects the entire manufacturing and agricultural sector, rules on services trade, digital issues like data localization, intellectual property rights that could affect drug accessibility, and promotion, facilitation, and protection of investment.
• Significant economic and social impact: As a result, an FTA has a significant effect on both the economy and society. Given this, it is reasonable to expect increased transparency throughout the FTA negotiating process as well as afterward.

Challenges with Indian FTA negotiations

• Lack of transparency in negotiations: India negotiates the majority of FTAs behind closed doors with little public knowledge of the goals and procedures used, and minimal oversight.
• There isn’t a strong foundation for FTA negotiations in the other nations that India is negotiating an FTA with. For instance, there are a number of strong institutions in the U.K. that promote some kind of transparency in the FTA negotiations. Additionally, there are institutional tools that make it possible to monitor the executive’s conduct before, during, and after the FTA’s signature.

Contrast case of India’s FTA

• No such publicly issued document is produced in India that argues in favour of signing an FTA and evaluates the effects it would have on the environment and society as a whole. The Commerce Ministry, the focal point for FTAs, only offers the most basic details about FTA negotiations on its website.
• There is no public record of the government’s interactions with stakeholders or how it responded to their concerns. It appears that the Commerce Ministry also has inter-ministerial meetings and consults with stakeholders.
• Absence of parliamentary oversight: India lacks a system for legislative oversight of executive actions during FTA negotiations. The legislative system in India provides for department-related committees to address important issues and make recommendations. However, the Indian government’s motivations for negotiating and signing an FTA are rarely examined by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce (PSCC).

Suggestions for advancing the India’s FTA framework

• Promote the goals of the FTA: India should learn from the U.K. book and create legislation regarding signing treaties, especially FTAs. These elements should be included in this law. When starting negotiations for a treaty like an FTA, the government should publicly lay forth its economic justification and strategic goals.
• Mandatory consultation with all parties involved: The executive should be required to communicate with all parties involved, address their concerns, and make this information public.
• Dedicated parliamentary committee to examine the FTA: The Indian Parliament should establish a committee similar to the IAC in the United Kingdom to examine the strategic goals of signing an FTA.
• The FTA shall be put up for debate in Parliament for a predetermined amount of time before being ratified by the executive, according to the procedure.

@the-end

While it is undeniable that the administration has the constitutional authority to sign foreign treaties or free trade agreements in general, this authority should be used in a way that holds the executive accountable. After all, holding the executive accountable for its actions is a fundamental component of democracy. It shouldn’t be any different when negotiating international agreements like free trade agreements.

India’s vice president recently travelled to Cambodia’s Phnom Penh to take part in the 19th ASEAN-India Summit.

Key highlights

• The foundation of India’s ACT-EAST policy is the relationship with ASEAN.

• India continues to support ASEAN’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific, he said.

Joint statement by ASEAN and India

• Changing the current strategic partnership into a comprehensive strategic partnership.
• The significance of preserving and advancing peace, stability, maritime safety and security, freedom of navigation, and overflight in the Indo-Pacific area was reaffirmed.
• The determination to strengthen India-ASEAN collaboration in a variety of areas, including marine activities, anti-terrorism, transnational crimes, cyber security, and the digital economy.
• Suggests hastening the revision of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) to make it easier to use, more straightforward, and conducive to trade.
• Both sides agreed to enhance cooperation in the space sector including “through the establishment of Tracking, Data reception and Processing Stations in Viet Nam and Indonesia.
• They reiterated the need for increased coordination and dialogue through ASEAN-led forums such as the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, the ASEAN-India Summit, the East Asia Summit, the Post-Ministerial Conference with India (PMC+1), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and the ASEAN-India Summit (EAMF).
• In order to guarantee a “future-ready, resilient, sustainable food supply,” the two parties decided to intensify their cooperation in the digitally supported agriculture sector.

India- ASEAN Relations

• In 1992, India started a formal dialogue with ASEAN as a “Sectoral Dialogue Partner” (and later, as a “Dialogue Partner” in 1996).

• India and ASEAN have had a dialogue partnership for 25 years, contact at the summit level for 15 years, and a strategic partnership for 5 years.

• Financial commitments

Three main formal institutional mechanisms to promote the India-ASEAN economic ‘connect’

1) ASEAN Economic Ministers-India Consultations (AEM + India)

The Commerce Minister attends meetings of the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM), one of the principal ASEAN ‘sectoral groupings’. A review of AITIGA has recently been the main topic of discussion at AEM-India sessions.

2) The ASEAN India Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (2003)

• The accord gives the formation of an ASEAN-India Free Trade Area a ‘mandate’. Its provisions are as follows:
• ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA, signed)
• The ASEAN-India Trade in Services Agreement (AITISA, was signed in 2014 and parties ratified it in 2018).
• The agreement on Investment (signed in 2014) has been finalized and ratified by all parties.

3) ASEAN-India Business Council (AIBC)

• It was established in 2003 to support India and ASEAN region’s Comprehensive Economic Cooperation.
• It is meant to serve as a private sector mechanism to provide Governments on both sides with authoritative feedback on their current policies and also recommend steps that Governments could take to further promote the ASEAN -India economic partnership.

Financial Cooperation

• The Indian government has established three funds to support ASEAN-India cooperation activities: ASEAN-India Cooperation Fund (AIF)
• ASEAN-India Green Fund (AIGF)
• ASEAN-India Science and Technology Development Fund (AISTDF).

The G20 presidency of India officially began on December 1 after the unveiling of the country’s logo, website, and theme by the Indian government. One Earth, One Family, One Future was Modi’s rallying cry, which was aptly emphasised by the phrase “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam.”

G20?

• The G20 is a global organisation that was founded in 1999 by the leaders of 20 of the world’s largest economies.
• The European Union and 19 of the largest economies in the world are included.
• More than 80% of the world’s GDP, 75% of trade, and 60% of the population are represented by its members.
• The leaders of the G20 nations occasionally take part in summits to address the topics or challenges that affect the world.
• India has been a G20 member since the group’s founding in 1999.

Current Global scenario and India’s G20 Presidency

• War between Russia and the west: It must however take into account a complex geopolitical situation, including increased hostility between the US and China and tensions between the G7 and Russia over the conflict in Ukraine.

• India’s attempts to practice meditation: The recent admonition from PM Modi to President Putin that “now is not the time for conflict” is rooted in the values of nonviolence and peace that are part of the Buddha and Gandhian legacies.

• Energy crisis: Developmental priorities must come first. It will be necessary to find common ground on disagreements on energy diversification and the newest trade and technological challenges.

• Economic crisis: Stagflation in the US, China, and Europe poses a threat to the prognosis for the world economy. An key requirement is macroeconomic and trade policy coherence.

• Disruptions in the supply chain: Modi promoted collaboration on three crucial issues—trusted source, transparency, and time frame—at the “Global Supply Chain Resilience” meeting in October 2021. He mentioned the disruption of supply chains brought on by the Ukraine issue at the SCO Summit this year, as well as the severe energy and food shortages.

India’s Stand

• Growing economy and rising stature: India’s G20 leadership corresponds with its rising stature and rapid economic growth rate, as well as its growing confidence.

• Growingly important to the developing world is the nation’s outstanding performance with the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), Direct Benefits Transfer, and Aadhaar authentication in welfare systems.

• Vaccine TRIPS waiver requests: The CoWIN platform’s adoption improved vaccine equity and accessibility. India has argued persuasively in favour of a TRIPS waiver to guarantee fair access to vaccine production.

• SAGAR and Blue Economy: The G20 may take notice of India’s recent international initiatives, such as SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in The Region), “blue economy,” “clean oceans,” and infrastructure that is disaster-resistant.

• India as true climate leader: PM Modi’s “Panchamrit” announcements at COP26, including net zero by 2070, 500 GW of non-fossil energy capacity by 2030, 50% of energy needs met by renewable sources by 2030, a reduction of 1 billion tonnes of carbon emissions by 2030, and a reduction of the carbon intensity of the Indian economy to less than 45% by 2030, established India as a climate leader.

@the-end

The broadest and most vulnerable constituency, notably in South Asia, should be represented by India’s presidency. This has the potential to significantly enhance the economic integration of South Asia, which is so important for India’s progress.

The horrific war in Ukraine, which is already in its ninth month and has shocked the entire world, is drawing more international attention as external affairs minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar makes his bilateral visit to Russia this week.

Ukraine’s war and India’s Strategy so far

• India’s balanced approach: There are good grounds for India to be pleased that the West now understands better its position on Ukraine. The Indian response to the problem has been under constant fire from the Western media and think groups in recent months for being lacking in moral clarity and strategic coherence in the face of Russia’s unwarranted aggression.

• India refused to expressly condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine over the course of the past nine months and pushed on a truce rather than calling for a dialogue between the warring parties. At the same time, India refrained from supporting Russian aggression, emphasised the need to uphold the UN Charter, emphasised the inviolability of territorial sovereignty, cautioned against the use of nuclear weapons, and attempted to raise awareness of the negative economic effects of the conflict on the “Global South.”

• America showed sensitivity to India’s position: In the Biden administration there was a measure of understanding of where Delhi was coming from and India’s long-standing equities in the relationship with Russia and the constraints it imposed on India. Official Washington never let the heat of the Ukraine crisis in Europe undermine the longer-term American imperative of engaging India to stabilize the Indo-Pacific. The same can’t be said about Europe, but then the continent was right in the middle of the gravest conflict since the Second World War. The European trauma from a shattered peace is real.

• India’s role in the grain shipment and nuclear power station: According to recent reports in the US media, India made diplomatic contributions at a number of pivotal points during the nine-month-long conflict, including helping to resolve disagreements over the grain shipment agreement from Ukraine and lowering the risks of a war aimed at the nuclear power station in eastern Ukraine at Zaporizhzhia.

India’s Role

Indian influence is minimal. South Block is in an intriguing position because of its good ties to both Moscow and Washington. However, communication between the US and Russia is not limited to India. Moscow and Washington are not wholly dependent on other parties.

Efforts by west and Russia

• Defence ministers’ communications: The defence ministers of the two nations have frequently spoken with one another, reminding one another of their redlines in the conflict. Winter will gradually reduce the opportunities for military operations in Ukraine, giving all sides a chance to pause, regroup, and re-evaluate their strategy and tactics.

• Putin’s approach: Putin’s present emphasis on obliterating Ukrainian cities and his sporadic threats to deploy nuclear weapons highlight Russia’s weakness rather than strength in the Ukraine war. From a military standpoint, Russia cannot easily claim a “win” in this conflict.

• Limitations of Putin: Putin may be forced to think about a fair draw that will preserve his political reputation and help Ukraine win some territory. Is it possible to say the same of the other Vladimir? Vladimir or Volodymyr the Great, who lived in the 10th century, is credited by both the Russians and the Ukrainians with founding their countries.

• Ukraine’s approach: Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine, has led the nation’s defence against Russian invasion with astonishing tenacity. The Ukrainian army, in contrast to the Russian troops, are fighting to defend their country from invasion and have dealt the Russians serious military defeats.

• Limitations of Ukraine: Can Zelenskyy liberate all of Russia’s occupied areas, including Crimea, which Russia seized forcibly in 2014? Zelenskyy may like to continue fighting until he achieves his objective, but the Western coalition that is supporting him is having second thoughts.

• Western sanctions against Russia: The West wagered that the severe economic sanctions it imposed when Moscow began its conflict with Ukraine would bring down the Russian economy. The sanctions’ consequences are starting to have a significant impact on Western cultures, but Russia is still standing.

• Cost of energy increasing and sanctions being ineffective Political support for a swift end to the battle is rising across Europe as the economic and energy costs of the war rise. Republicans and Democrats in the US, which has emerged as Ukraine’s main ally, are both questioning the current American “blank cheque” for Ukraine. In this week’s midterm elections for the US Congress, Republicans are predicted to perform strongly, which might exacerbate internal conflict and put a shadow over American foreign policy, especially the Ukraine approach.

• Although these events do not necessarily spell the end of US strategy, Washington is starting to reassess. Washington provided Kyiv with crucial private counsel this week, urging more adaptability in Zelenskyy’s approach to talks with Putin.

@the-end

It is essential to put an end to the war in Ukraine since the western economy, particularly, is experiencing an energy and inflation crisis. India’s role as a peace broker for the Ukraine conflict has little effect. West and Russia need to see that their hopeless quest for total victory is actually doing more harm than good. Better for the world if the war ends sooner.